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IN THE SUPREME CODRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ERNIE BRUNO, : 
Case No. 860153 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : 
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, aka : 
PLATEAU LEASING COMPNAY, a BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-
Delaware C o r p o r a t i o n , : APPELLANT 
D e f e n d a n t / R e s p o n d e n t . : 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
T h i s i s an a c t i o n f o r w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e . The i s s u e s 
p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e : 
1. Whether t h e lower c o u r t committed e r r o r by 
s t r i k ing port ions of a f f i d a v i t s submitted by p l a i n t i f f in 
opposition to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
t h e r e a f t e r g r an t i ng d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. 
2. Whether t h e lower c o u r t commit ted e r r o r in 
g r a n t i n g de fendan t ' s Motion for Summary Judgment even if 
the lower c o u r t ' s order s t r i k i n g p o r t i o n s of p l a i n t i f f ' s 
a f f i d a v i t s submit ted in o p p o s i t i o n to de fendan t ' s Motion 
for Summary Judgment was not in e r ro r . 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
P l a i n t i f f b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n a l l e g i n g a p o l i c y which 
was p a r t of p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t r a c t of employment . P l a i n t i f f 
was d e p o s e d on N o v e m b e r 6 , 1 9 8 5 . T h e r e a f t e r d e f e n d a n t 
s u b m i t t e d a M o t i o n f o r Summary J u d g m e n t b a s e d o n t h e 
p l e a d i n g s and p l a i n t i f f ' s d e p o s i t i o n . 
P l a i n t i f f s u b m i t t e d two a f f i d a v i t s in o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e 
M o t i o n . F u r t h e r , p l a i n t i f f r e l i e d on h i s d e p o s i t i o n 
t e s t i m o n y in a r g u i n g a g a i n s t t h e Mot ion . 
D e f e n d a n t moved t o s t r i k e p o r t i o n s )f p l a i n t i f f ' s 
a f f i d a v i t s . Tha t m o t i o n was g r a n t e d e v e n though p l a i n t i f f 
was n o t g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e s p o n d . 
I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e o r d e r s t r i k i n g p o r t i o n s o f 
p l a i n t i f f ' s a f f i d a v i t s d e f e n d a n t ' s Mot ion fo r Summary J u d g -
ment was g r a n t e d . T h i s a p p e a l f o l l o w e d . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
P l a i n t i f f s u b m i t s t o t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e l o w e r c o u r t 
e r r e d a s a m a t t e r of law by g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n f o r 
Summary J u d g m e n t . P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t s 
s u b m i t t e d by p l a i n t i f f in o p p o s i t i o n t o d e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n 
fo r Summary Judgment p r e s e n t m a t e r i a l i s s u e s of f a c t which 
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w e r e i m p r o p e r 1 y s t r i k en , I1 von i t f he lownr r n i i t l 1 n t d c r 
s t r i k i n g p o r t i o n s of the p l a i n t i f f ' s two I/I a f f i d a v i t s was 
I I r i.) 11 k i , in in in i mi i > in II I I I" in in i inn in f i I in i n 11 in | 111 i • 1 1 ' n f r i i I i" ! f h e 
l o w e r c o u r t in p l a i n t i f f ' s d e p o s i t i o n whK li c r e a t e d a 
m a t e r i a l i s s u e of fact which p r e c l u d e d summary judgmen t . 
The ma t e r i a 1 i s s u^  i I I 11 il w 11 i i IIIi 11 MM 1 11111 i I . imiiiiiii.11 y 
judgment h e r e i n is the s u b s t a n c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p o l l y, 
II ie f end., i ii I . 11II in I ! i l i e Mc I i l1" I I i | The d i s p u t e it* t h e 
a c t u a l c o n t e n t ol that p o l i c y , 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I: The 1 ower court erred in striking portions 
o f t he a f f i d a v i t s p r ese n t ed by p ] a i n t: i ft in opposition Lo 
(let e n d a n t!| s M o t i o n f o r S u mm a r y J • :i 3 g m e i I t • •i' 
P l a i n t i f f f i l ed h i s c o m p l a i n t a l l e g i n g d e f e n d a n t wroi ig- -
I I I i ii i • 11 11 .i rip I i I I I in. I t flP f endan t had f o r ced p 1 i i n t i f f f u 
t e i m i n a t e hi1- employment- in r o n t r a v e m ion ol c po J i c y 
e s t a h i i s h e d hy a c o u r s e of d e a l inq wh ich became a p a r t . f 
I I II .in i II in I II I  I * I inn I I r e ' n n n t i n n I r c I i II" I i i n ! i l l "  i i iijup 1 a i f l t 
paragraph h ) , befendant's answer admitted it had a poJicy 
(Defendant's answer paragraph 6) The issue establ. ished by 
t h e p J (j a d i ,i i ( j « „ , t 1 : , e • i i , :i 3 t 1 I e i :i e 1 1 i m : = :: II: 1 1 :i s ' 1 ii • ::;; a >. i :i :1 
p l a i n t i f f submi ts that i s an i ssue o f f ac t. c e subs t a n c e 
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of an employer's policy is the issue of fact which should 
be submitted to a jury. Yartzoff v. The Democrat-Hera Id 
Publishing Co., Inc., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978), 
Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d 72 (Wash. 1965) Cussimanio v. 
Kansas City Southern Rai lway Company, 5 Kan. App. 2d 379, 
617 P.2d 107 (1980). 
Defendant submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment 
which was unsupported in any fashion and was accompanied 
only by a memorandum in support. This memorandum, however, 
merely contained statements of alleged fact again without 
support of any evidence. 
The material fact issue in this case is the substance 
of the defendant's policy. Defendant states at page 9 of 
its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Jud-
gment that the policy alleged by plaintiff "never was a 
policy of Plateau." That statement of fact is unsupported 
by any documentation as required by Rule 56 U.R.C.P. 
The order of the lower court striking portions of 
plaintiff's affidavit and granting defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment runs contrary to the legal standard for 
evaluating motions for summary judgment. 
"The summary disposal of a case 
serves a salutary purpose in avoiding 
the time, trouble and expense of a trial 
when it is justified. But unless it is 
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c l e a r l y so, there are other e v i l s to be 
g u a r d e d a g a i n s t . A p a r t y w i t h a 
l e g i t i m a t e cause , but who i s unab le to 
af ford an appea l , may be turned away 
wi thout h i s day in c o u r t ; o r , when an 
appeal i s t aken , i f a r e v e r s a l r e s u l t s 
and a t r i a l i s o r d e r e d , t h e t i m e , 
t rouble and expense i s increased ra ther 
than d iminished. I t i s to avoid t he se 
e v i l s and to safeguard the r i g h t of 
access to the courts for the enforcement 
of r i g h t s and the remedy of wrongs by a 
t r i a l , and by a jury if des i red , tha t i t 
i s of such importance t h a t the cou r t 
should take care to see t h a t the p a r t y 
a d v e r s e l y a f fec ted has a f a i r oppor -
t u n i t y to p r e s e n t h i s c o n t e n t i o n s 
a g a i n s t p r e c i p i t a t e a c t i o n which w i l l 
d e p r i v e him of t h a t p r i v i l e g e . His 
c o n t e n t i o n s as to the f a c t s should be 
cons idered in the l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e 
to him, and on ly if i t c l e a r l y appears 
t h a t he could not e s t a b l i s h a r i g h t to 
r e c o v e r y under t h e law s h o u l d such 
a c t i o n be taken; and any doubts which 
e x i s t should be r e s o l v e d in favor of 
affording him the p r i v i l e g e of a t r i a l . " 
R e l i a b l e F u r n i t u r e Co. v. F i d e l i t y and 
Guaranty Ins . 398 P.2d 685 at page 688. 
This Court has a l so s ta ted the following with reference 
to a review of an order granting summary judgment, "We are 
obliged to review the record in the l i g h t most favorable to 
the p a r t y a g a i n s t whom the motion was granted . . . . We 
are cognizant of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of permitt ing l i t i g a n t s 
to f u l l y p r e s e n t t h e i r case to the c o u r t and t h a t a summary 
judgment p r e v e n t s t h i s . For t h a t reason c o u r t s a r e , and 
5 
should be# r e l u c t a n t to invoke t h i s remedy." Brant v . 
S p r i n g v i l l e Banking Company, 353 P.2d 460, 462. The 
i n s t a n t case i s p r e c i s e l y the kind of case on which the 
p a r t i e s should be able to present the i r en t i r e case. 
Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P. requi res an a f f ian t be competent to 
t e s t i f y and s t a t e fac ts admissible in evidence. P l a i n t i f f 
s ta ted in paragraph 8 of h is Aff idavi t that he was "aware" 
of f igh ts involving t h i r t y (30) ind iv idua l s forty percent 
(40%) of which were underground, yet defendant argued tha t 
p l a i n t i f f fa i led to comply with Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P. There 
i s , however, nothing in the record i n d i c a t i n g a lack of 
competency by the p l a i n t i f f to t e s t i f y to these f a c t s . 
Defendant a lso implied p l a i n t i f f lacked knowledge because 
p l a i n t i f f used the word "aware" i n s t e a d of another te rm, 
e.g. kncws Of. The word aware i s def ined as having o r 
showing knowledge. 
P l a i n t i f f submits tha t the function of the lower o u r t 
on a motion for summary judgment i s to safeguard a pa r ty ' s 
r igh t to th i s day in cour t . We further submit tha t t h i s 
s c r u t i n y of language in an a f f i d a v i t runs counter to our 
system of j u s t i c e . P l a i n t i f f a rgues to t h i s o u r t t h a t 
t h e r e i s nothing in the record which i n d i c a t e s any th ing 
o t h e r than p l a i n t i f f ' s knowledge about a course of a c t i o n 
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by defendant which p l a i n t i f f i s a l l e g i n g became part of 
p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t r a c t of employment. P l a i n t i f f s t a t e d in 
the v e r i f i c a t i o n to h i s a f f i d a v i t that the content thereof 
" i s t rue and c o r r e c t to the b e s t of my knowledge . . . ." 
P l a i n t i f f should not be penal ized for adding the balance of 
the wording conta ined w i th in the V e r i f i c a t i o n as i t does 
not ind icate that the statements made in the a f f i d a v i t are 
anything but those fac t s within p l a i n t i f f ' s knowledge. 
The same i s t rue with r e s p e c t t o the a f f i d a v i t of Vopel 
Lander. The statements in h i s a f f i d a v i t are a f f i rmat ive , 
w i thout i n d i c a t i o n that they are made on informat ion or 
b e l i e f , and not conclusory in nature. 
The s t a t e m e n t s conta ined in t h e s e twp (2) a f f i d a v i t s 
contain the essence of p l a i n t i f f ' s case against the defen-
dants. That the defendant makes an a f f i rmat ive statement 
in w r i t i n g about i t s p o l i c y ( i . e . t h a t "No person s h a l l 
p a r t i c i p a t e in f ight ing or horse play on Company property." 
- See Appendix II to d e f e n d a n t ' s Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment.) and t h e n , in f a c t , t a k e s 
a c t i o n c o n t r a r y to that p o l i c y . P l a i n t i f f ' s a f f i d a v i t s 
contain fac t s from which a fact f inder could conclude that 
p l a i n t i f f was d i scharged in c o n t r a v e n t i o n of de fendant ' s 
p o l i c y . The statements therein were made with knowledge by 
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witnes se s competent to t e s t i f y and were improperly s t r i k e n . 
Whi le an employer has the r i g h t t o t e r m i n a t e an employee 
under the p r i n c i p l e of "at w i l l " employment without cause. 
Bui l o c k v . D e s e r e t Dodge Truck Center , I n c . , 11 Ut. 2d 1, 
354 P.2d 559 (1960) . However, t h a t r i g h t may be abrogated 
or q u a l i f e d by c o n t r a c t . Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d (Wash. 
1 9 6 5 ) , Perdue v . J.C. Penney Co. I n c . , 470 F Supp 1234 
(D.C. N.Y. 1979 ) , Pugh v. See 's Candies , I n c . , 171 Cal 
Rptr. 917 (1981), Wood v^ Metropolitan Atlanta G i r l s ' Club, 
Inc», 233 S.E. 2d 862 (Ga. 1977) , P l e a s u r e Driveway and 
Park D i s t . of P e o r i a v . J o n e s , 367 N.E. 2d 111 ( 1 1 1 . App. 
1977) . In the i n s t a n t c a s e , the r i g h t was so abrogated or 
q u a l i f i e d . 
Defendant's Safety Guidel ines Manual s t a t e s : 
"Observance of the fo l lowing Rules i s a 
Requirement to Employment with Plateau 
Mining Company. If you choose not t o 
Observe them you w i l l be s u b j e c t to 
r e p r i m a n d , s u s p e n s i o n or p o s s i b l e 
terminat ion." 
This "Safety Guidel ines Manual" was submitted to the lower 
c o u r t as Appendix II to d e f e n d a n t ' s Memorandum in Support 
of i t s Motion for Summary Judgment. The manual was a l s o 
an e x h i b i t to the p l a i n t i f f ' s depos i t ion . In addi t ion the 
p l a i n t i f f was required to s ign the fo l lowing statement: 
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"I understand t h a t knowledge of the 
conta ined r u l e s and g u i d e l i n e s (of the 
Safety Guidel ines Manual) and observance 
of them i s a requirement for employment 
by Plateau Mining Company." 
(See Exhibit 2 to p l a i n t i f f ' s deposit ion) 
I t i s c e r t a i n l y arguable that defendant put in p lace a 
p o l i c y which was p a r t of t h e employment c o n t r a c t . 
P l a i n t i f f i s seek ing the o p p o r t u n i t y to p l a c e be fore the 
fact finder the fac t s as they a c t u a l l y ex i s ted at Plateau 
Mining. See Yartzpff v . Democrat-Hera Id P u b l i s h i n g Com-
pany, I n c . 9 Supra 
P l a i n t i f f submits t h a t t h e r e are m a t e r i a l i s s u e s o f 
fact which precluded summary judgment herein. Further, the 
lower court's conclus ion "that there was no cause of ac t ion 
which could l ead to" (a p o l i c y r e l a t i v e to p l a i n t i f f ' s 
employment) (See paragraph 1 on page 2 of the lower 
c o u r t ' s Ruling on Moti >n to Recons ider Summary Judgment 
dated February 24, 1986) i s based on the lower c o u r t ' s 
e a r l i e r r u l i n g s t r i k i n g r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of the p l a i n -
t i f f ' s two (2) a f f i d a v i t s . 
The Michigan Supreme Csurt reviewed two (2) cases very 
s imi lar to t h i s case. The court there s ta ted , 
" . . . [S]uch a prov i s ion may become part of the 
c o n t r a c t e i t h e r by e x p r e s s agreement, 
ora l or w r i t t e n , or as a r e s u l t of an 
e m p l o y e e ' s l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s 
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grounded in an employer's p o l i c y s t a t e -
ments . . . . A jury c o u l d a l s o f i n d for 
T o u s s a i n t based on l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a -
t i o n s grounded in h is employer's wri t ten 
p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t s s e t f o r t h in t h e 
manual of personnel p o l i c i e s . 
We hold only that an employer's express 
agreement to t erminate o n l y for c a u s e , 
or s t a t e m e n t s of company p o l i c y and 
procedure to that e f f e c t , can g i v e r i s e 
to r i g h t s enforceable in contract . 
Whi le an employer need not e s t a b l i s h 
p e r s o n n e l p o l i c i e s or p r a c t i c e s , where 
an employer chooses to e s t a b l i s h such 
p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s and makes them 
known to i t s e m p l o y e e s , the employment 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s presumably enhanced. . . 
. No pre-employment n e g o t i a t i o n s need 
take p l a c e and the p a r t i e s ' minds need 
not meet on the s u b j e c t ; nor does i t 
mat ter tha t the employee knows noth ing 
of the p a r t i c u l a r s of the employer ' s 
p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s or t h a t t h e 
employer may change them u n i l a t e r a l l y . 
I t i s enough that the employer chooses , 
p r e s u m a b l y in i t s own i n t e r e s t , t o 
c r e a t e an e n v i r o n m e n t in which t h e 
employee b e l i e v e s t h a t , whatever the 
p e r s o n n e l p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s , they 
are e s t a b l i s h e d and o f f i c i a l a t any 
g i v e n t ime , purport t o be f a i r , and are 
a p p l i e d c o n s i s t e n t l y and u n i f o r m l y to 
each employee . The employer has then 
c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n " i n s t i n c t wi th an 
o b l i g a t i o n . " 
We ho ld that employer s t a t e m e n t s of 
p o l i c y , such as the B l u e Cross Super-
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visory Manual and Guide l ines , can g ive 
r i s e to contractual r i g h t s in employees 
w i t h o u t e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s 
m u t u a l l y agreed t h a t the p o l i c y s t a t e -
ments would create contractual r ights in 
the employee , and, h e n c e , a l t h o u g h the 
statement of p o l i c y i s signed by neither 
par ty , can be u n i l a t e r a l l y amended by 
t h e e m p l o y e r w i t h o u t n o t i c e to t h e 
employee, and contains no reference to a 
s p e c i f i c employee , h i s job d e s c r i p t i o n 
or c o m p e n s a t i o n , and a l t h o u g h no 
reference was made to the p o l i c y s t a t e -
ment in pre-employment i n t e r v i e w s and 
t h e e m p l o y e e d o e s n o t l e a r n of i t s 
ex i s tence u n t i l a f ter h i s hir ing," Tous-
s a i n t v . B lue Cross and B l u e S h i e l d o f 
Michigan, 292 NW 2d 880 at pages 885, 
890, and 892. 
The Michigan court summed up i t s p o s i t i o n s u c c i n t l y 
when i t sa id , 
"If t h e r e i s in e f f e c t a p o l i c y t o d i s -
miss for cause o n l y , the employer may 
not depart from t h a t p o l i c y a t whim 
s imply because he was under no o b l i g a -
t i o n to i n s t i t u t e the p o l i c y in the 
f i r s t p l a c e . Hav ing announced t h e 
p o l i c y , p r e s u m a b l y w i t h a v i e w t o 
O b t a i n i n g t h e b e n e f i t of improved 
employee a t t i t u d e s and behav ior and 
improved q u a l i t y of the work force , the 
employer may not t r e a t i t s promise as 
i l l u s o r y , " 292 N.W. 2d 880 at page 895. 
P l a i n t i f f h e r e i n i s s e e k i n g what the Michigan Court 
a l lowed Mr. Toussaint which i s , 
"An e m p l o y e r who o n l y s e l e c t i v e l y 
enforces r u l e s or p o l i c i e s may not r e l y 
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on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t a breach of a r u l e 
i s a breach of the contract , there being 
in p r a c t i c e no r e a l r u l e . An employee 
discharged for v i o l a t i n g a s e l e c t i v e l y 
enforced r u l e or p o l i c y would be p e r -
mi t t ed to have the jury a c c e s s whether 
h i s v i o l a t i o n of the r u l e or p o l i c y 
amounted t o good c a u s e . R u l e s and 
p o l i c i e s uniformly appl ied are , however, 
as much a part of the "common law of the 
job" and a par t of the employment con-
t r a c t as a promise to d i s c h a r g e o n l y for 
cause ," 292 N.W. 2d 880 at page 897. 
(Emphasis added.) 
ISSUE I I : The lower court erred in g r a n t i n g d e f e n -
dant ' s Motion for Summary Judgment even i f the c o u r t ' s 
order s t r i k i n g p o r t i o n s o f p l a i n t i f f ' s a f f i d a v i t s was 
proper. 
The cruc ia l fac t i s sue i s the substance of defendant's 
p o l i c y regard ing f i g h t i n g . P l a i n t i f f argues t h a t the 
p o l i c y , as e s t a b l i s h e d by a course of conduct, i s contrary 
to the written p o l i c y expounded by defendant. 
P l a i n t i f f was q u e s t i o n e d d u r i n g h i s d e p o s i t i o n 
regarding his knowledge of f i gh t s on company property. 
P l a i n t i f f , b e g i n n i n g on page 49 of h i s d e p o s i t i o n 
t e s t i f i e d , 
Q. T e l l me, when you say i t ' s a common 
occurrence, do you mean f ight ing? 
A. Oh, y e s . 
Q. Okay. You t o l d me a b o u t Mr. 
Leonard and Bob B e e s l e y . Other then 
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those two p e o p l e , who e l s e have you seen 
f i g h t i n g ? 
A. Oh, t h e r e ' s numerous p e o p l e . We've 
g o t a l i s t t h a t ' s a b o u t 20 i n d i v i d u a l s 
t h a t a r e on i t . 
Q. Who g o t a l i s t ? 
A. I ' v e g i v e n t o my l a w y e r a l i s t o f 
20 i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t have been i n v o l v e d 
in f i g h t i n g . 
Q. How did you g e t the l i s t ? 
A. Oh, w e l l , t h r o u g h my t i m e b e i n g 
t h e r e I know who's b e e n in f i g h t s and 
who's n o t , and t h e n I ' v e had o t h e r 
i n d i v i d u a l s from t h e mine or w h a t e v e r 
who I ' v e a s k e d t h a t h a v e been i n f i g h t s 
on t h e i r c r e w s t o g i v e me t h e i n f o r m a -
t i o n , and they have . 
Q. Can you t e l l me who you g o t t o g i v e 
you l i s t s ? 
A. W e l l , m o s t of i t , l i k e I s a y , came 
from m y s e l f and Kevin Er ickson . That's 
an i n d i v i d u a l t h a t ' s g i v e n me some 
names. 
Q. Okay. Who e l s e ? 
A. L e t ' s s e e , one i n d i v i d a u l t o l d me 
he was i n a f i g h t h i m s e l f and I c a n ' t 
t h i n k o f h i s name . He was a g u y I 
d i d n ' t know. And another i n d i v i d u a l , 
Bob B e e s l e y , who I ' v e mentioned b e f o r e , 
we in a f i g h t and h e ' s g i v e n me a few 
n a m e s . B a s i c a l l y h i s own n a m e , 
a c t u a l l y , a l o n g wi th f i g h t i n g wi th Paul 
Leonard. 
Q. Who e l s e ? 
A. I can't think of anybody else right 
now. 
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Q. Can you t e l l me— 
A. That's b a s i c a l l y i t . 
Q. Can you t e l l me t h e names t h a t 
Kevin Er ickson gave you? 
A. No, I c a n ' t . T h e r e were j u s t a 
c o u p l e o f them and I c a n ' t r e c a l l 
e x a c t l y . 
Q. Do you r e c a l l how many t o t a l names 
t h e r e a r e on your l i s t ? 
A. I t ' s r o u g h l y 2 0 . 
Q. Did you b r i n g your l i s t w i t h you 
today? 
A, No, I d i d n o t . 
Q. Do you remember any of the names? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. B e s i d e s Bob B e e s l e y ? 
A. Yeah, Chad T a b e r . 
Q. I'm s o r r y ? 
A. Chad T a b e r . 
Q* Taber? 
A. Y e s . 
Q. Okay. 
A. Mayo O'Hearon. 
Q. Mayo? 
A. Y e s , Mayo. 
Q. Okay. 
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A, L e t ' s s e e , Bob B e n n e t t . 
Q. Okay. 
A. Ben D a r l i n g . 
Q. Okay. 
A. L e t ' s s e e , Ron D a l t o n . 
Q» O k a y . 
A. B u d d y Weaby . 
Q. O k a y . 
A. L e t ' s s e e , t h a t ' s a b o u t i t o f f t h e 
top of my head. Oh, Henry M i l l s . 
Q. Any o t h e r s t h a t you can th ink o f ? 
A. That a b o u t i t r i g h t now t h a t I can 
t h i n k o f . 
Q. But t h e r e are another ten or t w e l v e 
on the l i s t ? 
A. Oh, y e s . 
In addition, the lower court had before it the "Safety 
Guidelines". This document is part of the record through 
its attachment to plaintiff's deposition as exhibit 1 and 
as a response to defendant's Request for Production of 
Documents. That document states, 
"OBSERVANCE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES IS A 
REQUIREMENT TO EMPLOYMENT WITH PLATEAU 
MINING COMPANY. IF YOU CHOOSE NOT TO 
OBSERVE THEM YOU WILL BE SUBJECT TO 
REPRIMAND, SUSPENSION OR POSSIBLE 
TERMINATION." 
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P l a i n t i f f was requ ired to s i g n an "Employee's S t a t e -
ment" which sa id f 
"I hereby acknowledge rece ipt of a copy 
of t h e S a f e t y G u i d e l i n e s and R u l e s 
Manual for P l a t e a u Mining Company. I 
understand t h a t knowledge of the c o n -
tained r u l e s and g u i d e l i n e s and observ-
a n c e of them i s a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r 
employment by Plateau Mining Company." 
(See Exhibit 2 to p l a i n t i f f ' s d e p o s i t i o n . ) 
Defendant has not denied a p o l i c y . The above ev idence , 
which was b e f o r e the lower court at the t ime defendant 
submit ted i t s Motion for Summary Judgment i n d i c a t e d a 
p o l i c y concerning i t s employees. P l a i n t i f f i s seeking an 
o p p o r t u n i t y to prove the subs tance of d e f e n d a n t ' s r e a l 
p o l i c y was and t h a t h i s t e r m i n a t i o n was c o n t r a r y to t h a t 
p o l i c y . 
"Whether in any p a r t i c u l a r c a s e an 
employer can d i s c h a r g e i t s employees 
without cause and not incur l i a b i l i t y i s 
a q u e s t i o n that i s to be r e s o l v e d with 
reference to the express and implied 
terms of the c o n t r a c t / ' Cuss imonio v . 
Kansas C i t y Southern Rai lway Company, 
617 P.2d 107 at page 112. 
The cour t in Marwil v . Baker, 499 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. 
Mich. 1980) s a i d , at page 573, 
"In Michigan an employee can have 
contractual r i g h t s in the procedures and 
b e n e f i t s found in statements of p o l i c y . 
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S e e ^ J J s j s a ijnt_ v^ BJLHf: C r o s s £ B l u e 
S h i e l d o f M i c h i g a n , 408 Mich. 5 7 9 , 292 
N.W. 2d 880 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . The Court in T Q U S -
s a i n t e x p l a i n e d that t h o s e c o n t r a c t u a l 
o b l i g a t i o n s c a n be i m p l i c i t i n t h e 
p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s o f the employer . 
T h a t C o u r t c i t e d and a d o p t e d t h e 
p o s i t i o n taken in Perry v . Sindermann by 
the United S t a t e s Supreme Court. 
l f[T}he law Of c o n t r a c t s in most , 
i f n o t a l l , j u r i s d i c t i o n s - l o n g 
has e m p l o y e d a p r o c e s s by which 
a g r e e m e n t s , t h o u g h n o t 
f o r m a l i z e d in w r i t i n g , may be 
* i m p l i e d . 1 E x p l i c i t c o n t r a c t u a l 
p r o v i s i o n s may be s u p p l e m e n t e d 
by other agreements impl i ed from 
x t h e p r o m i s o r ' s words and c o n -
duct in the l i g h t of surrounding 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ' And, [ t ] h e 
m e a n i n g o f [ t h e p r o m i s o r ' s ] 
w o r d s and a c t s i s f o u n d by 
r e l a t i n g them t o t h e u s a g e of 
the p a s t . " 408 Mich, a t 617 -68 , 
292 N.W. 2d a t 8 9 4 , c i t i n g P e r r y 
v . £l£^££.ma^£ri, 408 U.S. 5 9 3 , 
6 0 1 - 0 3 , 92 S.Ct. 2 6 9 4 , 2 7 0 0 , 33 
L.Ed.2d 570 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
"The j u r y i s a l w a y s p e r m i t t e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e 
e m p l o y e r ' s t r u e r e a s o n f o r d i s c h a r g i n g t h e e m p l o y e e . " 
T o u s s a i n t v . B l u e Cross £ B l u e S h i e l d of Michigan, supra a t 
We s u b m i t t h a t e v e n w i t h o u t t h e s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e 
a f f i d a v i t s s u b m i t t e d by p l a i n t i f f t h e r e were s u f f i c i e n t 
f a c t s b e f o r e t h e l o w e r c o u r t t h a t c r e a t e d m a t e r i a l f a c t 
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i s s u e s to prec luded summary judgment. The most s i g n i f i c a n t 
f a c t i s s u e i s the c o n t e n t of d e f e n d a n t ' s p o l i c y . 
CONCLUSION 
P l a i n t i f f i s s e e k i n g a r e v e r s a l o f t h e l o w e r c o u r t ' s 
o r d e r g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n f o r Summary Judgment 
t h e r e b y a l l o w i n g p l a i n t i f f t o p r e s e n t , in d e t a i l , t h e 
e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d by p l a i n t i f f in the two (2) a f f i d a v i t s 
submit ted in o p p o s i t i o n to d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, in h i s d e p o s i t i o n and h i s answers to d e f e n d a n t ' s 
I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . 
P l a i n t i f f s u b m i t s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t e s t a b l i s h e d a 
p o l i c y by a course o f d e a l i n g w i t h i t s employees which was 
c o n t r a r y t o i t s w r i t t e n p o l i c y . D e f e n d a n t i s s a y i n g One 
t h i n g and d o i n g a n o t h e r . The p l a i n t i f f was c a u g h t i n t h e 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 
We r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t t h a t t h i s Court r e v e r s e t h e 
lower c o u r t ' s order g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and return t h i s c a s e for t r i a l . 
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